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Abstract: In this paper we look at a specific issue with practical Turing tests, namely the right of the machine to 
remain silent during interrogation. In particular we consider the possibility of a machine passing the Turing test 
simply by not saying anything. We include a number of transcripts from practical Turing tests in which silence has 
actually occurred on the part of a hidden entity. Each of the transcripts considered here resulted in a judge being 
unable to make the ‘right identification’, i.e. they could not say for certain which hidden entity was the machine.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In his 1950 paper entitled ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950), Alan Turing wished to consider the 
question, "Can machines think?" Rather than get bogged down by definitions of both of the words "machine" and "think" he 
replaced the question with one based on a much more practical scenario, namely his imitation game.  
 
Turing himself described the game in these terms: “The idea of the test is that a machine has to try and pretend to be a man, 
by answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing. A considerable portion of a 
jury, who should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by the pretence” (Copeland, 2004).  In this case Turing 
spoke about a jury (possibly 12 people) rather than the ‘average interrogators’ he mentioned separately (Turing, 1950).  
 
Central to Turing’s thesis is a machine’s ability to post appropriate responses to any questions. However, what we look at in 
this paper is what if the most appropriate response, (as deemed by an entity) to a particular question, is silence? What is the 
thinking nature of a machine when, rather than responding to an inappropriate or inane question, it does not answer it with an 
utterance? Why should a truly intelligent machine ingratiate itself with humanlike responses just to be considered human? Is 
not the truly Turing-intelligent machine the one that knows when and why to be silent? 
 
So what we consider here is the role/effect of silence in Turing’s Imitation Game on the part of a hidden entity, especially 
when that entity is a machine. We then push this to the extreme by looking at the case when a machine is systematically 
silent in a sustained fashion and how this is reflected in the standard interpretation of functioning of the game. Our argument 
is supported by practical examples obtained from actual tests when machines have remained silent. These examples, which 
have (we suspect) generally arisen from a machine or communications failure rather than a decision on the part of a machine, 
have been included mainly to indicate how interrogators (the terms interrogators and judges are used here interchangeably to 
mean the same thing) respond in such circumstances.   
 
INTERPRETING TURING 
 
There are many different interpretations of Turing’s imitation game and much controversy has arisen as to which of these, if 
any, was Turing’s own intended version (Moor, 2003). The vast majority appear to view the game in the form of what is 
commonly known as the ‘Standard Turing Test’ (Sterrett, 2000), and this is the interpretation taken here. It is a literal 
interpretation based essentially on what Turing actually said in his presentations and papers and without recourse to 
tangential connections and/or pure conjecture on what a paper’s author believes that Turing really meant to say. We 
acknowledge as examples of this, that some see it as being something to do with artistic and emotional intelligence (Smith, 
2015), whereas others deem it to be concerned with modelling the human mind by generating its verbal performance 
capacity (Harnad, 2014).  
 
Others meanwhile regard it in terms of considering the gender aspect, the sex of the human foil being important in the test 
(Sterrett, 2000; Lassègue, 1996; Hayes & Ford, 1995; Genova, 1994). In one interpretation of Turing’s test the female is 
expected to tell the truth, but we are not far off that time when silence was preferred to the “jabbering” of women, because 
“speech was the monopoly of man” and that “sounds made by birds were part of a conversation at least as intelligible and 
intelligent as the confusion of tongues arising at a fashionable lady’s reception” (Herbert Maxwell, 19th century Scottish 
politician, see Bourke, 2011).  
 In his 1950 paper Turing said: “I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible, to programme computers, … , to 
make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of 
making the right identification after five minutes of questioning (Turing, 1950). To put this more simply, for a machine to 
‘pass’ the Turing test, in all of the tests in which a machine takes part, the interrogators must make the wrong identification 
(i.e. not the right identification) 30% or more of the time after, in each case, 5 minute long conversations. However we can 
take it directly that the wrong identification is anything other than the right identification. 
 
The Turing test involves a machine which pretends to be a human in terms of conversational abilities.  The ‘right 
identification’ stated by Turing can either mean that a judge merely correctly identifies the machine or that they correctly 
identify, at the end of a paired conversation, which was the machine and which was the human (Traiger, 2000). These 
different viewpoints are discussed further later.  However we are not so interested here with cases in which a judge mistakes 
a human for a machine. This phenomenon, known as the confederate effect (Shah and Henry, 2005), has been discussed 
elsewhere (Shah and Warwick, 2010a; Warwick et. al., 2013; Warwick and Shah, 2014). Such a decision might however 
affect the judge’s decision regarding the machine being investigated in parallel.  
 
In its standard form, Turing’s imitation game is described as an experiment that can be practicalized in two different ways 
(see Figure 1) (Shah, 2011): 
1) one-interrogator-one hidden interlocutor (Figure 1a),  
2) one-interrogator-two hidden interlocutors (Figure 1b).  
In both cases the machine must provide “satisfactory” and “sustained” answers to any questions put to it by the human 
interrogator (Turing, 1950: p.447). However, what about in the theoretical case when the machine takes the 5th amendment: 
“No person shall be held to answer”?1 Would we grant “fair play to the machines”? (Turing, 1947; Hodges, 2010). 
 
 
                                                          
1 Cornell University, Legal Information Institute: http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment: “No person shall be held to answer for 
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury” 
  
 
Figure 1: Turing’s two test for his imitation game: Left- Figure 1a, one-to-one; Right- Figure 1b, one judge-two hidden interlocutors 
 
Of the types of (standard) test looked at here, the 3-participant tests have previously been shown to be stricter tests, i.e. more 
difficult for machines, than 2-participant tests in which an interrogator converses with only one hidden entity, either a human 
or machine, at a time (Shah et. al., 2012). Hence these are the tests that we consider at length in this paper, particularly with 
the practical examples. It is worth making it clear however that for the main argument in the paper, the results apply to either 
type of practical test. 
 
In the two hidden entity tests that the authors have conducted (see Figure 1b) judges were clearly told beforehand that in 
each parallel conversation one of the hidden entities was human and the other was a machine, the most recent example being 
in the 2014 Royal Society tests (Warwick and Shah, 2015). The interrogators/judges were however given no indication as to 
whether the LHS (Left Hand Side of the computer screen as they viewed it) or RHS would be human or machine. On the 
judges’ score sheets each judge could mark both the LHS and RHS entities as being Human, Machine or they could say if 
they were Unsure about either or both (Shah et. al., 2012).  
 
In the following section we consider a number of transcripts obtained from practical Turing tests.  We refer here to 5 minute 
long tests only and show transcripts from such tests. Although this is the run time stated by Turing himself (Turing, 1950), it 
is not at all a critical issue with regard to the main argument raised in this paper. As you will see, in the tests carried out there 
was a hard cut off at the end of each discourse and no partial sentences were transmitted. Once a sentence had been 
transmitted it could not be altered or retracted in any way.  
 
We have not edited the text of these transcripts in any way, indeed they are reported exactly as they occurred. Any 
typographical, spelling, punctuation or other grammatical errors that appear in the transcripts are those which actually 
appeared, they have not arisen through poor editorial practice on the part of the authors or publishers. Also any periods of 
silence or where no response appears are an exact indication of what actually happened.  
 THE ROLE OF SILENCE IN TURING’S IMITATION GAME 
 
In this paper we do not argue for or against a particular interpretation of the test, some of these have been explained earlier 
and in more depth elsewhere (Shah, 2013; Shah, 2011; Shah and Warwick, 2010a). What the authors contend in this paper is 
that Turing’s ideas to examine machine thinking point towards numerous directions that are worthy of scientific enquiry, 
including the point we wish to raise here, which is to consider the question as to when would it be worthwhile for a machine 
to remain silent in an imitation game? Would that not be the strongest test for a machine, in an exploration of whether it can 
reply appropriately, to any and all inappropriate questions? Consider firstly this purely imaginary conversation (Transcript 1) 
taking place over 5 minutes between 10.58am and 11.03am one day between a human ‘Judge’ and a hidden interlocutor, 
‘Entity’: 
 
Transcript 1 
[10:58:14] Judge: Good day 
[10:58:30] Entity: A very good day to you too :) 
[10:59:01] Judge: How old are you? 
[10:59:22] Entity: That's a bit rude? 
[11:00:06] Judge: How old are you? 
[11:00:31] Entity: I’m not going to answer that, old/young it’s irrelevant 
[11:00:47] Judge: How old are you? 
[11:01:27] Entity:  
[11:01:52] Judge: How old are you? 
[11:02:17] Entity:  
[11:02:45] Judge: How old are you? 
[11:02:52] Entity:  
 
What if in that imaginary conversation the ‘hidden entity’ was a computer programmed with a personality of a middle-aged 
person who was sensitive about their age? What if that imaginary Turing test was extended to 11.08am and it continued for 
another five minutes with the hidden interlocutor refusing to answer, remaining silent and the Judge was not quite sure at the 
end of it whether they were talking to a human or a machine?  
 
If the reader feels an interrogator would not in a realistic test simply repeat questions over and over then they would be 
incorrect. As an example, consider an actual transcript (Transcript 2) involving a human interrogator, Duncan Graham-
Rowe, an award-winning science, technology, medical and environment journalist, acting as a judge in the 2006 Loebner 
Prize (Shah and Warwick, 2009). 
 
 
Transcript 2 
Judge: Is it safe? 
Entity: Probably. 
Judge: Is it safe? 
Judge: Is it safe? 
Entity: Do you think it's safe? 
Entity: Of course. 
Judge: Is it safe? 
Entity: Yes. 
Judge: Are you sure? 
 
To note: An earlier utterance of  “Is it safe?” appeared in the film ‘Marathon Man’ in which Laurence Olivier was quizzing 
Dustin Hoffman. Firstly we can confirm that the judge in Transcript 2 was human. Secondly the entity in this conversation 
was in fact a machine, Jabberwacky. Judges in practical Turing tests have introduced all sorts of their own tricks to ‘out the 
machine’, for example the 2005 Loebner Prize judge and philosopher Ned Block’s use of non-words “cslkjslw weicmslw 
weos” (Shah and Warwick, 2007) 
 
Instances of no-reply at all from hidden interlocutors have actually occurred in practical Turing tests on a number of 
occasions, most recently in the series of experiments conducted at The Royal Society by both authors on 7 June 2014. Here 
is one of those conversations. The timing given is the exact timing on the day of the tests. The hidden entity in this case was 
the machine, ‘Cleverbot’. What follows is an actual five minute transcript (Transcript 3) in full: 
 
Transcript 3 
[10:58:08] Judge: good day 
[10:58:08] Entity:  
[10:58:46] Judge: is no response an answer 
[10:58:46] Entity:  
[10:59:35] Judge: am i not speaking you're language 
[10:59:35] Entity:  
[11:00:25] Judge: silence is golden 
[11:00:25] Entity:  
[11:01:32] Judge: shhh 
[11:01:32] Entity:  
[11:03:07] Judge: you make  great conversation 
[11:03:07] Entity: 
 
The hidden entity in this real Turing test conversation was not identified as being either human or machine, the Judge made 
the decision that they were ‘Unsure’. This was taken from a one judge-two hidden interlocutors, simultaneous comparison 
test (see Figure 1b). We have not shown the parallel hidden human entity transcript as it is not particularly relevant to the 
argument. Suffice to say that the hidden human, for which there was a corresponding fluid conversation, was categorised 
correctly by the judge to be a human. Despite this decision and initial instructions the interrogator remained firm that they 
were Unsure about the nature of the entity in Transcript 3. 
 
Previously, in a series of Turing test experiments in 2008 at the University of Reading, on four occasions one machine 
recorded an ‘unsure’ classification from the Judge in its total of 12 tests – in fact that is an incorrect identification of greater 
than 30 per cent. We do not wish to say here, indeed it would be churlish of us to suggest, that that particular machine 
‘Brother Jerome’ passed the Turing test, Turing’s ideas are far too important to belittle them in this way. However following 
the Turing test argument rigorously, then that is exactly what happened.  
 
The conversations under investigation between the same machine (Brother Jerome) and a different judge on each occasion 
took place in Session 2 on 12 October 2008 at Reading University (see Shah and Warwick, 2010abc). Again these were one 
judge-two interlocutor, simultaneous comparison tests as in Figure 1b. Three of the conversations are transcribed below, in 
each case the ‘Judge’ was the human interrogator and the ‘Entity’ was the machine, Brother Jerome. Different judges were 
involved in these transcripts: 
 
Transcript 4 
 
[12:34:03] Judge: wotcha, how's it going?  
[12:34:31] Judge: hello? 
[12:34:36] Entity: 
[12:34:40] Entity: Don\'t mind me - I\'m just messing with your head :) 
[12:35:00] Judge: grr 
[12:35:31] Judge: how's your day been so far?  
[12:35:35] Judge: finding this interesting?  
[12:36:13] Judge: you still therE? 
[12:38:57] Entity: 
[12:39:22] Entity: So far but no further? What of the future, do you think? 
 
In the case of Transcript 4, the Judge gave an ‘Unsure’ classification but also reported “test failed technical issues”. This 
particular interrogator, an adult male and a consultant with Microsoft, was the most accurate judge in the 2008 series of 
Turing tests, in terms of the number of correct classifications of hidden entities. Importantly the judge did not classify the 
machine involved as being a machine, i.e. they did not identify the machine correctly. 
 
Transcript 5 
 
[13:12:39] Judge: Have you ever listened to mozrt? How does it make you feel? 
[13:13:11] Entity: 
[13:13:34] Judge: Did you write anything? I can't see it?  
[13:14:05] Entity: 
[13:14:50] Judge: Still not seeing anything, having computer trouble? 
[13:15:22] Entity:  
 
The conversation, if it can be called that, concluded after 5 minutes. There were no further utterances from either party after 
the [13:14:50] judge input. The Judge in Transcript 5 was a male teenager. He made no other comment other than his 
‘Unsure’ classification.  
 
Transcript 6 
 
[13:21:55] Judge: Hello.  
[13:22:04] Entity:. 
[13:22:29] Judge: Could I know the difference between a computer and a human from you? 
[13:23:02] Entity: Tell me more... 
[13:24:09] Judge: If you are a computer, you should tell me more.  
[13:24:41] Entity: 
[13:25:31] Judge: What you told me is a blank line. 
[13:26:03] Entity: 
[13:26:32] Judge: Hello?? 
[13:26:38] Entity: 
 
The Interrogator in this conversation, Transcript 6, was a non-native English speaking adult male (Chinese) who made this 
comment along with his ‘unsure’ categorisation: “I don’t get enough replied information” – the judge was not fooled, 
effectively he did not receive enough information to make a decision as to the nature of the silent interlocutor. 
 
On these three occasions (Transcripts 4, 5 and 6) the Judge, in each case, was unable to correctly identify the machine and, 
as shown, was unable to make a decision based on inadequate information from their interlocutor, so they gave their decision 
on the nature of the hidden entity as ‘Unsure’. 
 
 
THE RIGHT IDENTIFICATION 
 
The concept of what is and what is not a ‘right identification’ is very important as far as a machine taking part in the Turing 
test, and the 30% pass mark, is concerned and we take a relatively strict approach in this sense. One viewpoint is that for a 
judge to make the ‘right identification’ they must correctly identify both the machine as being a machine and the hidden 
human as being a human (Traiger, 2000). This means that any other decision on the part of a judge would not be a ‘right 
identification’, which therefore includes cases in which either the machine is selected as a human and/or a human is selected 
as a machine. Also included are cases in which the judge is Unsure about either or both entities as the judge in such cases has 
failed to identify the machine as a machine and the human as a human – the right identification. 
 
In our stricter interpretation however, we are only really interested in the cases in which the machine was itself not correctly 
identified, the judge stating either that the machine was a human or, and this is very important for this paper, that they were 
Unsure about it. We have in fact shown several practical examples of the latter of these two cases.  
 
In the case of two hidden entity tests (Figure 1b), the judge also needs to make a decision concerning the human (not that the 
interrogator knows that the entity is a human) in parallel, sometimes selecting them as a machine, sometimes as a human and 
sometimes being Unsure. What we do not include, either in a general sense or as examples in this paper, are cases in which a 
machine was correctly identified as being a machine but where the parallel human in each case was incorrectly selected as 
being a machine and/or the judge gave an Unsure mark against the human, even though these would not be a right 
identification. In other words we only consider cases here in which machines are incorrectly identified, either being referred 
to as a human or where the judge is Unsure. In each of the practical examples shown in fact it is the Unsure classification 
(not the right identification) which was selected by the interrogator.  
 
SILENCE IS GOLDEN 
 
Turing said that in the test a machine had to try and pretend to be a man (although now/here we take that to mean human). In 
his 1950 paper he also pointed to the fact that at the end of 5 minutes the judge had to make a decision as to the nature of the 
entity. If they made the right identification and correctly identified the machine then this would effectively be a point against 
the machine whereas if the judge either thought that the machine was a human or if they were Unsure as to its nature then 
this would be a wrong identification and would be a point for the machine. The pass mark for a machine in the test was set 
by Turing to be 3 or more points out of every 10 (Turing, 1950).  
 
But here we face a critical issue, what if a machine was to take the fifth amendment? The fifth amendment is an amendment 
to the United States Constitution establishing that, among other things, no person can be compelled to testify against himself 
or herself and has the right to remain silent. We extend this here to the case of ‘itself’ by also including the instance of 
machines taking part in the Turing test. In devising his test Turing specifically created the necessity for a machine to fully 
converse with the judge and in doing so, in the majority of cases, fail the test by giving themselves away as clearly being a 
machine. 
 
But what if a machine remains completely silent during a five minute conversation? In such a case a judge receives no 
response to any of their questions or discussion from the hidden entity and therefore, in theory at least, cannot make the right 
identification and definitely say that they had been conversing with a machine. It would not be expected that a judge, under 
such circumstances would categorize the silent entity as being a human, although that is a possibility, the most likely case is 
for the judge, as we have seen in the practical examples, to give an ‘Unsure’ response. This of course is not a right 
identification and is therefore a point for the machine.  
 
It is thus quite possible for a machine to simply remain silent to any utterances of a judge (not difficult at all to program this, 
in fact the computer can be removed all together) and to thereby pass the Turing test if at least 3 out of 10 judges as a result 
either rate the machine as being a human or indicate that they are unsure. The only thing acting against such a non-
participation strategy is the fact that the machine is, in each conversation, competing against a human and if the judge is 
certain that the other (hidden) entity is a human then they can deduce that therefore the silent entity must be a machine. 
However from the practical examples it appears that interrogators frequently make a straightforward decision on the nature 
of a hidden machine based on that machine’s performance rather than on its competitor’s appearance.  
 It is also worth pointing out that in practice many humans are actually categorized as machines in such tests (Warwick and 
Shah, 2014). Therefore it is also potentially possible that a (silent) machine can be categorized as being human mainly 
because their hidden human competitor is categorized by the judge as being a machine. The overall possibility of passing the 
Turing test (and being regarded as being a thinking entity) by simply not responding at all (taking the 5 th), is seen to be a 
major loophole in the Turing test that has hitherto not been pointed out. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In no cases of ‘silence’ or failure to respond by a machine has a Judge yet classified the machine to be a human, as far as we 
are aware. But it is also apparent that in no cases of ‘silence’ or failure to respond by a machine has a Judge yet classified the 
machine to be a machine, i.e. the right identification, as far as we are aware. Indeed in either case it would be difficult to see 
how a judge could confidently make such a decision with no information to go on. 
 
In all the four judge-machine conversations presented here, given in full in Transcripts 3-6, the judges made the decision on 
each occasion that they were unsure. In fact technical problems led to the machines, Cleverbot in 2014, and Brother Jerome 
in 2008 being unable to respond to the Judge’s input. Both these machines were in fact the weakest performers, 
conversationally speaking, in experiments involving other machines at their respective events (see Shah and Warwick, 2010c 
for the best machine in 2008, Elbot and Warwick and Shah, 2015 for the best machine in 2014, Eugene Goostman).  
 
The normal way of thinking is that the whole purpose/goal for a machine in Turing's Imitation Game is to provide the sorts 
of answers a human would give to the interrogators' questions. But what if the machine became truly intelligent and made a 
decision not to reply because it considered the human judge’s question inappropriate or rude?  
 
Turing appropriately referred to the interrogators as being judges because that is just what they are. Each judge’s decision 
must be based on the conversational responses that an entity gives. If an entity remains completely silent then there is no 
way a judge can, in all honesty, make the decision that the entity is either a human or a machine. There is simply not 
sufficient information at their disposal. However in one judge – two interlocutor tests  (Figure 1b) if it is known by the judge 
apriori that one entity is a human and the other is a machine then they can at least decide on the nature of a silent entity 
simply as being the opposite of their decision on the other entity. That said, it is known that hidden human entities are 
frequently identified as being machines.  
 
In this paper we have put forward the concept that a machine can take the 5th amendment and remain silent throughout, not 
so much when there is technical failure, but when the machine itself chooses to remain silent. The result of this would be that 
a machine could potentially pass the Turing test by simply not responding at all. What we have shown however are actual 
transcripts in which silence on the part of the machine has resulted in the judge not making a right identification of deciding 
that the machine is indeed a machine.  
 
It might be suggested that the Turing test merely needs a patch or fix of some kind in order to be operational. Perhaps if an 
entity is silent for longer than 15 or 20 seconds then that conversation would be immediately classified as being nul and 
void. The whole purpose being to attempt to avoid any (imitation) game playing by a machine. But such a decision would 
need to apply equally to both machine and human hidden entities and further instructions might need to be given to the 
hidden humans to ensure that they respond quickly enough to the last utterance from the interrogator.  In a practical test there 
would also need to be a timer on key presses (for humans) as presently a message is only sent when the carriage return is 
pressed, otherwise a long sentence might be timed out. However by the same measure a machine might be programmed to 
enter a number of letters followed by a similar number of delete keys thereby indicating a blank space or simply a full stop 
as we saw in Transcript 6. 
 
Numerous other issues arise here. Firstly instructing hidden humans to respond in a specific way appears to start to defeat the 
whole point of the game in that they are supposed to be themselves, humans. If they are told/programmed to behave in a 
mechanistic way then that will undoubtedly be easier for a machine to imitate. On top of this Turing never said anything 
about humans (or machines for that matter) responding in a set time. A hidden human, just like a machine, needs to be given 
as long as they want to reply.    
 
Another point here can also be made with regard to counting a particular conversation as nul and void because of machine 
game playing. This is not an appropriate scientific response, we cannot simply ignore particular results because we do not 
like the look of them. In the worst case it might be appropriate to ‘automatically’ decide that a silent transcript results in an 
unsure classification. But why not give the interrogator their freedom to select, after all that is an important part of the game. 
Why should we take away powers of decision from a judge because of specific things that crop up in the conversation?  
 
We are looking here at Turing’s Imitation game and, particularly in its practical instantiation, the authors believe that we 
should stick to what Turing said about the game in order to bring it about as closely as possible to his directions. Certainly 
we should not unscientifically ‘fiddle’ the results in order to get an answer that we might prefer. Turing specifically referred 
to the right identification, meaning that an interrogator correctly identifies a machine as being a machine. If the interrogator 
does not so do then that is a point to the machine. What we have discussed in this paper is the ploy of a machine to bring 
about such a result by merely remaining silent.     
   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overall it is clearly a weakness of the Turing test that it does require a machine taking part to condemn itself by its 
utterances, as judged subjectively by the human interrogator. But also the hidden human foil for the machine is judged 
similarly on their responses. Hidden humans have indeed been wrongly classified as being a machine on a number of 
occasions (see e.g. Warwick et al, 2013). By merely invoking the 5th amendment, the machine actually stating this in its 
opening rejoinder perhaps, how would a judge take this response? Would the judge think it is a smart machine trying to 
avoid answering the sorts of every day questions that humans engage in or would they wrongly classify it as being a human? 
If this was done on a sufficient number of occasions it could result in a machine ‘passing the Turing test’ simply by 
remaining silent. Of course, this does beg the question, what exactly does it mean to pass the Turing test? 
 
Turing’s game is based around a machine being discovered as being a fake human based on what it does wrong rather than 
what it does right. Often one particularly poor response, even it is preceded by ten excellent responses is sufficient for an 
interrogator to decide that they are not talking with a human. This encourages machine developers to cause quite boring non-
committal responses to often be sent, for machines to ask questions themselves or for canned sentences to be evoked. But 
how can a machine give itself away if it invokes the 5th amendment and simply remains silent? 
 
If a Turing test judge is faced merely by stone wall silence in response to their utterances, how can the judge possibly tell if 
they are interacting (if that is what it is) with either a machine or a human? It could be a machine or a hidden human 
that/who has made the decision, for whatever reason, not to respond. However the lack of response could rather be caused by 
a technical problem with either the communication system or with the entity itself. 
 
We opened the paper by considering that Turing introduced his imitation game as a replacement for the question “Can 
machines think?” (Turing, 1950). The end conclusion by many as a result of this is that if a machine passes the test then we 
have to regard it as a thinking machine. When/if a machine passes the test based on normal conversation then this is a nice 
philosophical problem which we do not wish to tinker with here. However when a machine passes the test by remaining 
silent this surely cannot be seen to be any indication at all of a thinking entity, otherwise we must necessarily agree that 
stones and rocks think. Therefore what we must finally conclude is that such a silent strategy fleshes out a serious flaw in the 
Turing test.   
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